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Abstract
In this thesis, I investigate the strategic provision of a public good in a dynamic
setting. The public good in question is reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, which
limits the public bad of climate change. Emissions can be reduced both through
demand- and supply-side policies, and countries differ in which type of policy they
prefer. Two stylized models are developed, with consumer countries that consume
fossil fuels, but produce none, and producer countries that produce fossil fuels, but
consume none.
In the first model, a producer country that does not care about the climate
interacts with consumer countries that do. It is shown that even though the producer
country does not care about the climate, it reduces production in order to limit
emissions.
In the second model, both producer and consumer countries care about the cli-
mate. It is shown that the nature of future climate policies matters for emissions
today. Between countries that prefer the same type of climate policy, the dynamic
public good problem is aggravated. However, between countries that prefer different
types of policies, the dynamic public good problem is alleviated.
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1 Introduction and Summary
It was shown by Samuelson (1954) that the socially optimal level of a public good will
generally not be provided through voluntary contributions. Furthermore, Fershtman
and Nitzan (1991) states that in a dynamic setting even less is provided, because
each agent contributes less when it is known that other agents will then contribute
more in the future. However, these conclusions may change if we acknowledge that
agents may have different preferences over the policies through which a public good
is provided.
My thesis investigates the strategic provision of a public good in a dynamic
setting, where future contributions depend upon past contributions, and agents have
different preferences over the ways in which it is possible to contribute to the public
good.
The public good in question is reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, which
limits the public bad of climate change. It is generally acknowledged that the public
good nature of a healthy climate is a major challenge to the prospects of preventing
climate change. This is strikingly formulated by Hardin (1968) as a "Tragedy of the
Commons".
However, emissions can be reduced through a range of policies, and it is unlikely
that agents are indifferent to these. Policies that aim to reduce emissions can be
grouped into demand and supply-side policies. A tax on consumption of fossil fuels
is an example of the former, a tax on production of fossil fuels an example of the
latter.
Both taxes would increase the price paid by consumers, and reduce the price
received by producers. The tax would be equal to the difference between these
prices. But, as an example, if these consumers and producers belonged to two
different countries, a consumer country and a producer country, and each country
returned tax revenue through lump-sum transfers, it is clear that the consumers
would be better off with their country imposing a tax on consumption than with the
producer country imposing a tax on production, and vice versa.
Also, the tax on consumption would reduce the market price of fossil fuels and
thus benefit other consumers and hurt producers, while the tax on production would
increase the market price and thus benefit other producers and hurt consumers.
It is clear that different types of future climate policies have different welfare
implications for consumer and producer countries, and for net importers and ex-
porters in a more general setting. If future climate policies depend upon the stock
of greenhouse gases, it seems intuitive that countries take into account the future
policy response to higher emissions today, and act strategically.
In this thesis, two models are developed to investigate such strategic interaction.
They are both two-period models, and for each model I find the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
The first model, presented in Section 3, is used to investigate strategic emissions
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reductions by a price-setter producer country that produces fossil fuels, interacting
with price-taker consumer countries that use demand-side climate policies.
The producer country could be thought of as a large country that controls the
world’s reserves of fossil fuels, or as a cartel of producer countries that cooperate in
order to maximize their aggregate welfare, such as the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). The consumer countries could be thought of as a large
number of small countries that fail to cooperate.
The main result is that even though the producer country does not care about
the climate, it takes into account how its production of fossil fuels affects the stock
of greenhouse gases, and reduces production in order to limit emissions.
The producer country’s motive is to avoid a future loss from a lower price due
to demand-side climate policies. Higher first-period emissions would increase the
second-period stock of greenhouse gases, and this would increase the consumer coun-
tries’ marginal harm from emissions. Second-period demand for fossil fuels would
be reduced. This would reduce the price the producer country could take for fossil
fuels, and the producer country would incur a loss.
If the producer country puts greater weight on future welfare, it reduces first-
period production more. The loss from a lower price in the second period then plays
a bigger role for the producer country when first-period production is set.
If the future cost of production is higher, the producer country reduces first-
period production less. The reason is that the a higher future cost makes the pro-
ducer reduce second-period production, which implies that there are fewer second-
period units of fossil fuels on which the producer country would lose from a lower
price.
The effect of a higher survival rate, which implies that a greater part of first-
period emissions remain in the atmosphere in the second period, is ambiguous. On
one hand, the effect of higher first-period emissions on the second-period price is
stronger, because first-period emissions then contribute more to the second period
stock. This would make the producer country reduce first-period production more.
But on the other hand, the increased amount of first-period emissions that remain in
the atmosphere in the second period has a negative effect on second-period demand.
The second-period quantity is reduced, which implies that there are fewer second-
period units of fossil fuels on which the producer country would lose from a lower
price. This would make the producer country reduce first-period production less.
Similarly, if the marginal damage of one consumer country increases in such a
way that it also increases more rapidly, the effect is ambiguous. Because marginal
damage increases more rapidly, the effect of higher first-period emissions on the
second-period price is stronger, because marginal harm from an increase in emissions
is bigger. Also, the price would have to be reduced more for this consumer country
to be willing to buy more fossil fuels again. Both these effects would make the
producer country reduce first-period production more. On the other hand, higher
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marginal damage from emissions implies lower demand and a lower second-period
quantity. This would make the producer country reduce first-period production less.
The second model, presented in Section 4, is used to investigate the strategic
response of both consumer and producer countries to future demand and supply-
side policies.
There is a Cournot game with four groups of countries: 1. Price-setting consumer
countries that are harmed by emissions and set quantities given the quantities set by
other price-setting countries. 2. Price-setting producer countries that are harmed by
emissions and set quantities given the quantities set by other price-setting countries.
3. Price-taking consumer countries that are not harmed by emissions. 4. Price-
taking producer countries that are not harmed by emissions.
A price-setting consumer country could be thought of as a large country using
demand-side climate policies, or as a demand-side coalition of countries such as the
countries of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).
A price-setting producer country could be thought of as a large country using
supply-side policies, or as a supply-side coalition of countries. Such coalitions might
not exist today, but supply-side policies are gaining interest, and the insights de-
veloped in the thesis could be valuable for our understanding of the impact of such
coalitions.
The model can also be used to evaluate the strategies of price-setting consumer
and producer countries that do not care about the climate, anticipating the future
climate policies of price-setting consumer and producer countries that do care about
the climate.
There are also price-taking consumer and producer countries that are not harmed
from emissions. These could be thought of as small countries that perceive their own
contribution to global emissions as negligible.
The main result is that consumer countries increase (decrease) consumption to-
day if the future response of other countries to higher first-period emissions has a
negative (positive) effect on the future price, and that producer countries reduce
(increase) production today if the future response of other countries to higher first-
period emissions has a negative (positive) effect on the future price.
The reason why a producer country reduces production today if the future re-
sponse of other countries to higher first-period emissions has a negative effect on
the future price is the same as it was in the first model. While in the first model
all climate-policies were demand-side policies that reduced the price, in the second
model there are both demand- and supply-side climate policies. If the demand-side
policies have the strongest effect on the price, a producer country reduces first-period
production just as in the first model.
However, if the supply-side policies of other producer countries have a stronger
effect on the price than the demand-side policies of the consumer countries, a pro-
ducer country increases first-period production. Higher first-period emissions make
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other producer countries reduce their second-period production, and this increases
the price. A higher price increases profits.
If the future response of other countries to higher first-period emissions has a
negative effect on the future price, a consumer country increases first-period con-
sumption in order to gain from a lower price next period. This could be the case if
the demand-side policies of other consumer countries have a stronger effect on the
second-period price than the supply-side policies of the producer countries.
On the other hand, if the future response of other countries to higher first-period
emissions has a positive effect on the future price, a consumer country reduces first-
period consumption in order to avoid losing from a higher price next period. This
could be the case if the demand-side policies of other consumer countries have a
weaker effect on the second-period price than the supply-side policies of the producer
countries.
Through this model, it is shown that the dynamic public good problem among
countries which prefer the same type of climate policy, is aggravated when the effect
of future climate policies on the price is taken into account. Not only does a coun-
try emit more in order to free-ride on greater future emissions reductions by other
countries, but it also emits more in order to gain from the favorable effect higher
emissions has on the future price, through the climate policy of other countries that
prefer the same type of policy.
However, between countries that prefer different types of policies, the public good
problem is alleviated when the effect of future climate policies on the price is taken
into account. A country still has incentive to emit more in order to free-ride on
greater future emissions reductions by other countries, but it also has incentive to
emit less in order to avoid losses due to the unfavorable effect higher emissions has
on the future price, through the climate policy of countries that prefer the other
type of policy.
A brief review of the literature follows next, in Section 2, with emphasis on the
relevance of the thesis to the different strands of literature. Then, in Section 3, the
first model is presented. In Section 4, the second model is presented. In Section 5,
further refinements and possible extensions are discussed. At last, some concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
There is an appendix at the end, containing proofs.
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2 Related Literature
Much of the literature on policies that aim to limit climate change focuses on abate-
ment in general, and does not distinguish between demand- and supply-side policies.
Papers such as Barrett (1994) discuss participation in self-enforcing International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs), Harstad (2012b,c) take participation as given
and investigate the consequences of incomplete contracting within a coalition, and
Battaglini and Harstad (2014) unites these two approaches, and shows how incom-
plete contracting can actually increase participation.
The literature on carbon leakage is of more direct relevance to this thesis, since
it emphasizes the differences between policies, and their effects on the price of fossil
fuels. Two papers, Hoel (1994) and Harstad (2012a), are reviewed in Subsection 2.1.
Wirl (1994) develops an insight similar to that of the first model of the thesis,
that an oil cartel may pre-empt a climate coalition. This paper, and others building
upon on it, are review in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 Carbon Leakage Is a Challenge That Can Be Over-
come
Since fossil fuels that are traded internationally, it is generally acknowledged that an
emissions reduction by a country or a coalition of countries does not necessarily lead
to a one-to-one reduction in global emissions. A reduction in consumption is partly
offset by increased consumption in other countries, and a reduction in production
is partly offset by increased production in other countries. This is referred to as
demand and supply-side carbon leakage, respectively.
Hoel (1994) develops an elegant solution to this challenge, exploiting that demand-
side carbon leakage is caused by an initial price reduction, while supply-side carbon
leakage is caused by an initial price increase: The optimal climate policy combines
demand and supply-side policies in such a way that, except for terms-of-trade effects,
the effects causing demand and supply-side carbon leakage offset each other.
The welfare consequences different types of policies have for the cooperating
countries is a key point in this paper, which explains the terms-of-trade effects. But
it is also noted that if then non-cooperating countries are importers of fossil fuels
they would be better off if the cooperating countries used demand-side policies,
and vice versa. This insight is a starting point for the second model of this thesis,
developed in Section 4, where I let there be different countries, or different coalitions
of cooperating countries, who all have climate policies and do not take the price as
given, and investigate their strategic interaction in a dynamic setting.
At the end of this subsection, it is discussed how the game in Hoel (1994) is
related to the the second period game of my first model, presented in Section 3.
But first, other results from Hoel (1994) are presented, and bridge the way to a
presentation of Harstad (2012a).
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A note on the use of the term first best in the following paragraphs: In Hoel
(1994), it is assumed that the non-cooperating countries take greenhouse gas emis-
sions from other countries as given. It is also assumed that these countries have no
climate policy, e.g. the demand and supply schedules of these countries are indepen-
dent of total emissions. Thus, the non-cooperating countries behave as if they are
not harmed by emissions. When I use the term first best in the following sections,
this only applies to the case where the non-cooperating countries actually are not
harmed by emissions. The term first best is not used in Hoel (1994). I do this
because it is then easier to appreciate the results of Harstad (2012a), which is dis-
cussed subsequently. That paper assumes in the main part that non-cooperating
countries are not harmed by emissions, and discusses the case were they are harmed
by emissions in an extension.
Even though the problem of carbon leakage is overcome by the combination of
demand and supply-side policies proposed by Hoel (1994), this solution is still not the
first best. An obvious reason for this is that the price-setting cooperating countries
exploit their market power. But even if they did not, the solution would not be first
best: There would still be produced and consumed units of fossil fuels for which
the the marginal social cost of production is greater than the marginal utility from
consumption.
This is the case because: 1. Consumption in the non-cooperating countries is un-
taxed, and this consumption is satisfied by untaxed production in non-cooperating
countries, and by production in cooperating countries which is taxed at less than
the Pigouvian tax rate. 2. Production in the non-cooperating countries is untaxed,
and this production is consumed by untaxed consumption in non-cooperating coun-
tries, and by consumption in cooperating countries which is taxed at less than the
Pigouvian tax rate.
Hoel (1994) shows that the cooperating countries can do better if they can set
the taxes in the non-cooperating countries directly, and compensate these countries
through transfers such that they are equally well off. The taxes can then be set such
that the sum of tax rates applying to a consumer and a producer trading fossil fuels
is equal to the to the marginal harm from emissions. If there were no terms-of-trade
effects, this solution would be first best.
However, this solution relies upon the possibility of setting tax rates in non-
cooperating countries directly. It should also be noted again that it is not first best,
since the cooperating countries do exploit their market power.
Harstad (2012a) shows that the first best can be achieved without dealing di-
rectly with non-cooperating countries, if trade in fossil fuel deposits is possible. The
cooperating countries then buy or lease deposits in non-cooperating countries. This
includes, but is not restricted to, the deposits that given the first best solution should
be left unexploited, e.g. the deposits that are most expensive to extract.
Then, the cooperating countries tax their own production, including production
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from bought or leased deposits, at a tax rate equal to the marginal environmental cost
of emissions, e.g. the Pigouvian tax rate. Marginal deposits are then left unexploited.
The countries need not fear about carbon leakage, since fossil fuel supply is locally
inelastic when all marginal deposits are controlled by the cooperating countries.
Also, in equilibrium no country is an importer or exporter, and because of this
there are no distortions due to the market power of the cooperating countries. Thus,
the first best solution is reached through supply-side policies.
It should be noted that these solutions are only first best if the non-participating
countries do not take harm from emissions. This is discussed and shown in Harstad
(2012a).
Next, the links between these works and the models in my thesis are further
discussed.
If the non-cooperating countries of Hoel (1994) were allowed to have climate
policies, e.g. set taxes based on their individual marginal harm from emissions,
given a stock of greenhouse gases, the game would just be a slightly more complex
version of the second period game of my first model, presented in Section 3. The
cooperating countries would then take into account the effect of first-period emissions
on the second-period price, just as in the model in Section 3. However, the effect
would be conditional upon (1) whether the cooperating countries are net importers
or exporters, and (2) the nature of future climate policies, which determine whether
the price actually increases or decreases if first-period emissions increase.
In extensions of the subgame following trade in deposit fuels, Harstad (2012a)
does actually let non-cooperating countries be harmed by greenhouse gases, and
does also develop a dynamic model with two periods. However, this is done in
separate extensions, and thus a strategic effect similar to the one in my model does
not appear.
The model in Section 3 could be extended to provide such results. However,
I have chosen to leave the development of results similar to these to the model in
Section 4, because I want to show that this strategic effect is present even if all the
countries with climate policies are price-setters.
Note that if the market for fuel deposits clears as described in Harstad (2012a),
no country would be a net importer or a net exporter of fossil fuels, and such strategic
effects would vanish. But there are considerable obstacles to such a market clearing,
one of them political security considerations.
It is thus not difficult imagine a situation where supply-side policies, including
buying of foreign deposits, are used to a much larger extent, but where countries are
still net importers or exporters of fossil fuels. It is then important to understand
how countries or coalitions with supply-side policies affect each other, and how they
affect with countries which prefer demand-side policies. The model in Section 4
makes some steps towards such a better understanding of this.
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2.2 An Oil Cartel May Pre-Empt a Climate Coalition
Wirl (1994) develops an insight similar to the main result of Section 3, and states
that "energy suppliers may preempt energy taxation and thereby may raise the price
at front". The interaction between a consumer’s government and a cartel of energy
suppliers is modeled as a differential game, e.g. with continuous and infinite time.
This allows for the determination of paths for both the producer price and the tax
on consumption. It is shown that that the producer price in the beginning of the
game is high in order to pre-empt future taxes on consumption.
This non-cooperative outcome is compared to the situation where a benevolent
social planner chooses the optimal path for extraction and consumption of fossil
fuels, labelled as the cooperative outcome. It is found that in the non-cooperative
outcome, extraction is delayed compared to the cooperative outcome. This is due
both to the monopolist’s standard exploitation of market power, and the pre-emption
effect.
Although the two-period setup of the model in Section 3 does not allow for price,
tax and extraction paths to be derived like in Wirl (1994), the relatively simple setup
allows for a very clear cut exposition of the pre-emption effect. This setup does also
facilitate comparative statics, which provide interesting results.
The model in Section 4 goes beyond Wirl (1994) in several aspects, by letting
both consumer and producer countries be price-setters, and investigating both the
interaction between countries which prefer the same policies and countries which
prefer different policies.
Liski and Tahvonen (2004) is a paper in the tradition from Wirl (1994), which
identifies a strategic effect that can not be derived from my two-period model. Their
model does also exhibit a differential game. As in Wirl (1994), buyers of fossil fuels
take the consumer price as given, while fossil fuels are sold by a cartel which set the
producer price. However, there is a buyer’s agency which sets a consumption tax and
give the revenues to the consumers. This tax has a Pigouvian element, but also an
element due to the fact that the agency takes into account the cartel’s pre-emption
strategy.
If damage from emissions is large, the cartel would like to delay production in
order to pre-empt future demand-side policies. If the pre-emption effect is strong,
which is the case if the consumers’ damage from emissions is high, the producer
price is decreasing over time, since gain from pre-emption is biggest if it is done
at an early stage. But the buyers’ agency knows this, and counteracts this with a
consumption subsidy in the early phase of the game. This subsidy comes in addition
to the Pigouvian element of the tax, and an import tariff. The tax on consumption,
which is the sum of these elements, may thus be increasing over time. The subsidy
element contributes to moving extraction to an earlier point in time. Then, there
are less fossil fuels left to extract in the future, and thus less future taxation for the
cartel to pre-empt.
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The consumers, or more precisely their agency, act strategically, but not in order
to pre-empt supply-side climate policies as in the second model of the thesis, pre-
sented in Section 4. The cartel does not care about the climate, and because of this
such effects can not arise.
Another paper that investigates the strategic adaption of a seller of fossil fuels
to changes in future demand is Gerlagh and Liski (2011). Here, the change in future
demand is caused by the transition to a substitute that makes fossil fuels obsolete.
This substitute takes time to develop, and the buyers have to rely on fossil fuels
in the transition period. If there is little fossil fuels left, the price will be high
and the transition period costly. This creates incentives for the buyers to initiate
the transition earlier. The seller counteracts this by delaying extraction, such that
supply increases, and the price decreases, as time passes. When fossil fuels become
cheaper it is less attractive to initiate the transition, and this compensates the buyer
for the increased transition cost.
9

3 Emissions Matter, Even If Climate Does Not
In this section, I develop a model of N + 1 countries which interact over two time
periods. N of these countries are referred to as consumer countries. These countries
consume fossil fuels, but produce none. They also care about climate change. The
last country is referred to as the producer country. This country produces fossil
fuels, but consume none.
The policymaker in each country perfectly represents the preferences of the in-
habitants. The policymakers set policy by setting quantities. In the following, I will
just refer to the countries, not the policymakers or the inhabitants.
The consumer countries care about the climate, while the producer country does
not. I will show that the producer country nevertheless chooses to reduce supply in
order to limit emissions of greenhouse gases.
Consumer country i’s utility from consuming xDti fossil fuels at time t, t = 1, 2,
is given by the function Uti(xDti ), which is increasing and concave. Fossil fuels are
bought at a price pt, which is taken as given. Country i’s expenses on fossil fuels is
given by ptxDti , and its welfare decreases linearly in these expenses.
Furthermore, the consumer countries are hurt by the stock of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere. In the first period, this stock is given by the aggregate consumption
of fossil fuels, xD1 ≡
∑
i x
D
1i. In the second period, a fraction δ of these emissions are
still in the atmosphere. Also, second-period emissions are added to the stock. Thus,
the second period stock of greenhouse gases is given by δxD1 +xD2 , where xD2 ≡
∑
i x
D
2i
is aggregate consumption in the second period. Country i’s harm from the stock
of greenhouse gases at time t is given by a function Hti of the stock, and Hti is
increasing and convex. In each period, consumer country i takes the consumption
of other consumer countries as given.
Each consumer country does not take into account the negative external effect
its emissions has on other consumer countries.
Thus, first period welfare of consumer country i is given by:
U1i(x
D
1i)− p1xD1i −H1i(xD1 )
And second period welfare of consumer country i is given by:
U2i(x
D
2i)− p2xD2i −H2i
(
δxD1 + x
D
2
)
In the first period, consumer country i discounts second period welfare by a factor
βi. It is assumed that in the first period, each consumer country takes the second-
period price and quantities as given, including its own second-period consumption.
The producer country’s cost of producing xSt fossil fuels at time t, t = 1, 2, is
given by the function Ct(xSt ), which is increasing and convex. Fossil fuels are sold
at a price pt. The producer country’s income from the sale of fossil fuels is given by
ptx
S
2i, and its welfare increases linearly in this income. The producer country is not
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hurt by emissions.
First period welfare of the producer country is given by:
p1x
S
1 − C1(xS1 )
Second period welfare of the producer country is given by:
p2x
S
2 − C2(xS2 )
In the first period, the producer country discounts second period welfare by a
factor β.
The producer country is a monopolist, and does not take the price as given. It
could be thought of as a large country that controls the world’s reserves of fossil
fuels, or as a cartel of producer countries that cooperate in order to maximize their
aggregate welfare.
One could think of the consumer countries as a large number of small countries
that fail to cooperate. Due to the small size of each country, it is reasonable to
assume price-taker behavior.
While clearly a simplification, the setup in this model is reminiscent of that in
the real world. Every country in the world consumes fossil fuels, while only some
countries have fossil reserves to extract. Some of these countries are even openly
cooperating through a cartel, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
Above, it was stated that each consumer country does not take into account the
negative external effect its emissions has on other consumer countries. However,
the setup allows for another interpretation of the harm function: It could be that a
group of countries actually do take into account the external effect of emissions on
each other. One should then interpret the harm function of one of these countries
as the sum of the individual harm functions of these countries. Such a group of
countries could be interpreted as a climate coalition, but in a restricted sense where
it is only through the internalization of each others’ harm from emissions that the
countries cooperate.
To achieve simplicity, the model is built around a producer country that does
not consume any fossil fuels. However, modeling this country as a net exporter of
fossil fuels would not change the nature of the results.
There are two periods, and the equilibrium of the second period depends on the
amount of emissions in the first period. Therefore, the model is solved by backward
induction.
I assume that every maximization problem has an interior solution.
The next paragraphs describe an approximation that is made.
When maximizing welfare, a consumer country takes the consumption of the
other countries as given, and thus acts as if an increase in its consumption of fossil
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fuels causes an equal increase in production.
Then, however, instead of expressing the second-period demand of each consumer
country as a function of the price, given first-period production and the second-
period production of the other consumer countries, an approximation is made: The
second-period demand of each consumer country is assumed to be a function of the
price, given first-period production and second-period production. This makes it
possible to express aggregate second-period demand as a function of the price, given
first-period production and second-period production.
This approximation is made because the producer country is assumed to set the
quantity, from which follows the price that equates demand to the quantity set. This
necessitates that aggregate second-period demand is a function of the price, first-
and second-period production, not a sum of each country’s demand given the price,
first-period production and the consumption of other countries.
This approximation is unlikely to have qualitative consequences, but is neverthe-
less somewhat unsatisfactory. It could have been avoided by letting the producer
country set the price, and then let the equilibrium quantity be given by the quan-
tity the consumer countries choose to consume at that price. The second-period
demand from each consumer country could then be expressed as a function of of the
price, given first-period production and the second-period production of the other
consumer countries.
An equivalent approximation is made with regard to first-period demand.
Note that none of these challenges arise in the second model, presented in Sec-
tion 4, where no such approximations are made.
3.1 Second-Period Optimization
In the second period, each consumer country maximizes welfare given the price, p2,
and first-period emissions, x1. For each consumer country, this defines demand as
a function of the price, given first-period emissions. Aggregate demand is given by
the sum of demand from all N consumer countries. Thus, aggregate demand is also
a function of the price, given first-period emissions.
The price that clears the market is the one that makes the consumer countries
demand exactly the amount that the producer country produces.
Thus, when the producer country maximizes its welfare by maximizing profits,
it knows which price it can ask for in order to sell various amounts of fossil fuels.
The Consumer Countries
Consumer country i chooses its consumption of fossil fuels, xD2i, to maximize welfare.
The price, p2, and first-period emissions, x1, are taken as given. The maximization
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problem:
max
xD2i
U2i(x
D
2i)− p2xD2i −H2i
(
δx1 + x
D
2
)
The first order condition:
U ′2i(x
D
2i)− p2 −H ′2i
(
δx1 + x
D
2
)
= 0 (1)
Then, the approximation described in the introduction is done, and consumer
country i’s demand for fossil fuels is expressed as a function of the price, given first-
and second-period emissions: xD2i(p2 | x1, xS2 ).
At the optimum, marginal welfare from the consumption of fossil fuels is equal
to the price. Marginal welfare is given by the difference between marginal utility
from the consumption of fossil fuels and marginal harm from the stock of greenhouse
gases. The consumption of other countries is taken as given, and thus the consumer
sees emissions as increasing one-to-one with its consumption of fossil fuels.
Then, the aggregate demand function is xD2 (p2 | x1, xS2 ) ≡
∑
i x
D
2i(p2 | x1, xS2 ).
However, when the partial effect of a marginal price increase on aggregate demand
is needed, this effect is assumed to be given by the sum over the partial effects on
the demand by each consumer country, obtained by differentiation of the first order
condition, Equation (4), without the approximation. Thus:
∂xD2
∂p2
=
∑
i
1
U ′′2i −H ′′2i
< 0
The following lemma establishes the effect of higher first-period emissions on
second period demand:
Lemma 1. Higher first-period emissions reduces second period demand for fossil
fuels:
∂xD2 (p2 | x1, xS2 )
∂x1
< 0
Proof. Differentiation of the aggregate demand function with respect to x1 yields:
∂xD2 (p2 | x1, xS2 )
∂x1
=
∑
i
∂xD2i(p2 | x1, xS2 )
∂x1
=
∑
i
δH ′′2i
U ′′2i −H ′′2i
< 0
Where the expression for ∂x
D
2i
∂x1
was found by differentiating the consumer country
first order condition, Equation (1), with respect to x1.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward: H2i is a convex function of
the stock of greenhouse gases. Higher first-period emissions implies that the stock of
greenhouse gases is larger. Then, due to the convexity of H2i, marginal harm from
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contributions to the stock of greenhouse gases is higher. It then follows that, at a
given price, the consumer countries will demand less fossil fuels.
Market Clearing
The producer country is the only producer of fossil fuels, and thus the price that
clears the market is the one that equates demand, xD2 (p2 | x1, xS2 ), to the quantity
that the producer chooses to produce, xS2 . This can be seen from the market clearing
condition:
xD2 (p2 | x1, xS2 ) = xS2 (2)
This defines p2(xS2 | x1), the price that clears the market as a function of the
producer country’s production of fossil fuels, given first-period emissions.
If the producer country wants to sell more, it must reduce the price for the
consumer countries to be willing to buy more. This follows from differentiation of
the market clearing condition with respect to xS2 :
∂p2
∂xS2
=
1− ∂xD2
∂xS2
∂xD2
∂p2
=
1−∑Ni H ′′2i (U ′′2i −H ′′2i)−1∑
i (U
′′
2i −H ′′2i)−1
< 0
Furthermore, the price that the consumer countries are willing to pay for a given
quantity of fossil fuels depends on first-period emissions, which contribute to the
stock of greenhouse gases. The following lemma establishes the effect of higher first-
period emissions on the price the producer country can take, if it wants to sell a
given quantity of fossil fuels:
Lemma 2. Higher first-period emissions reduces the price the consumers are willing
to pay for a given quantity of fossil fuels:
∂p2(x
S
2 | x1)
∂x1
< 0
Proof. This follows from differentiation of the market clearing condition, Equa-
tion (2), with respect to x1, keeping xS2 constant:
∂p2(x
S
2 | x1)
∂x1
= −
∂xD2
∂x1
∂xD2
∂p2
< 0
The consumer countries would never be willing to pay a more for a unit of fossil
fuels than their marginal welfare from the consumption of it. Higher first-period
emissions reduces marginal welfare from the consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, if the
same quantity is to be sold, the producer country must reduce the price.
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The Producer Country
As shown, the producer country knows which price it can ask for if it wants to sell
a certain quantity of fossil fuels. To find the optimal quantity, the producer country
must balance the following concerns:
If the producer country produces an additional unit, it earns a profit on that
unit. On the other hand, in order to sell that additional unit it must reduce the
price. Only then will the consumers be willing to buy it. Thus, producing another
unit implies lower income from inframarginal units, since each of these is now sold
at a lower price. This is the standard problem of a monopolist.
The maximization problem of the producer country:
max
xS2
p2(x
S
2 | x1)xS2 − C2(xS2 )
The first order condition:
p2(x2 | x1) + x2∂p2(x2 | x1)
∂xS2
− C ′2(x2) = 0 (3)
This defines the second period monopoly quantity x2 and price pm2 ≡ p2(x2 | x1)
as functions of the first-period quantity x1.
At the optimum, the profit from selling another unit is equal to the loss from a
lower price on inframarginal units.
3.2 First-Period Optimization
In the second period, each consumer country maximizes welfare given the price,
p2. For each consumer country, this defines demand as a function of the price.
Aggregate demand is given by the sum of demand from all N consumer countries.
Thus, aggregate demand is also a function of the price. The indirect aggregate
demand function defines which price the consumers are willing to pay for various
amounts of fossil fuels.
Then, the producer country maximizes its welfare by maximizing profits, knowing
which price the consumer countries are willing to pay for various amounts of fossil
fuels.
Each country takes into account how first period consumption or production of
fossil fuels affect their own welfare in the second period. The consumer country takes
the second-period price and quantity as given, while the producer country takes into
account how first-period emissions affect second-period price and quantity.
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The Consumer Countries
Consumer country i chooses its consumption of fossil fuels, xD1i, to maximize welfare.
The price, p1, is taken as given. The maximization problem:
max
xD1i
U1i(x
D
1i)− p1xD1i −H1i(xD1 ) + βi
[
U2i(x2i)− p2x2i −H2i
(
δxD1 + x2
)]
The first order condition, omitting arguments:
U ′1i − p1 −H ′1i − βiδH ′2i = 0 (4)
Then, the approximation described in the introduction is done, and consumer
country i’s demand for fossil fuels is expressed as a function of the price, given
first-period emissions: xD1i(p2 | xS1 ).
The consumer takes into account that a fraction δ of first-period emissions affects
its second period welfare. Apart from that, the interpretation of the first order
condition is similar to that in the second period.
The aggregate demand function xD1 (p1 | xS1 ) ≡
∑
i x
D
1i(p1 | xS1 ), and its properties
can be derived in the same way as for the second period.
As for the second period, when the partial effect of a marginal price increase on
aggregate demand is needed, this effect is assumed to be given by the sum over the
partial effects on the demand by each consumer country, obtained by differentiation
of the first order condition, Equation (4), without the approximation. Thus:
∂xD1
∂p1
=
∑
i
1
U ′′1i −H ′′1i
< 0
Market Clearing
The price that clears the market is the one that equates demand, xD1 (p1 | xS1 ), to
the quantity that the producer chooses to produce, xS1 . This can be seen from the
market clearing condition:
xD1 (p1 | xS1 ) = xS1 (5)
This defines p1(xS1 ), the the price that clears the market as a function of the
producer country’s production of fossil fuels. If the producer country wants to sell
more, it must reduce the price for the consumer countries to be willing to buy more.
This follows from differentiation of the market clearing condition with respect to xS1 :
∂p1
∂xS1
=
1− ∂xD1
∂xS1
∂xD1
∂p1
=
1−∑Ni H ′′1i (U ′′1i −H ′′1i)−1∑
i (U
′′
1i −H ′′1i)−1
< 0
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The Producer Country
As in the second period, the producer must balance the profit from producing an
additional unit against the loss from a lower price on inframarginal units. But
in the first period, the producer country must also take into account how first-
period emissions affect second period welfare. The reason is that the price consumer
countries are willing to pay for fossil fuels in the second period depends on the stock
of greenhouse gases. The maximization problem is then:
max
xS1
p1(x
S
1 )x
S
1 − C1(xS1 ) + β [p2(x2 | x1)x2 − C2(x2)]
The first order condition:
p1(x1) + x1p
′
1(x1)− C ′1(x1)
+ β
[(
p2(x2 | x1) + x2∂p2(x2 | x1)
∂xD2
− C ′2(x2)
)
dx2
dx1
+ x2
∂p2(x2 | x1)
∂x1
]
= 0
The first three terms of the first order condition concern the first period profits
from the production of fossil fuels. The earnings from producing another unit must
be balanced against the loss due to a lower price on inframarginal units.
The term beginning with β represents the effect of higher first-period emissions
on second period welfare. However, the producer country knows that for any level
of first-period emissions, it will choose the optimal quantity in the second period.
Thus, a marginal change in the monopoly quantity does not affect welfare, since
marginal welfare is zero at the optimum. This follows from the envelope theorem,
and is given by the second-period first order condition for the producer country,
Equation (3), which can be used to simplify the second-period first order condition:
p1(x1) + x1p
′
1(x1)− C ′1(x1) + βx2
∂p2(x2 | x1)
∂x1
= 0 (6)
This defines the first period monopoly quantity x1 and price pm1 ≡ p1(x1).
It is clear that the producer country cares about how its production in the first
period contributes to a higher stock of greenhouse gases in the second period. The
reason is that a higher stock of greenhouse gases reduces the price received for infra-
marginal units, because the consumer countries’ marginal welfare from consumption
of fossil fuels is lower.
The main result of this model concerns this strategic effect on the choice of first
period production:
Proposition 1. Even though the producer country does not care about the climate,
it takes into account how its production of fossil fuels affects the stock of greenhouse
gases, and reduces production in order to limit first-period emissions.
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Proof. This follows directly from the first-period first order condition of the producer
country, Equation (6), and Lemma 2.
Thus, the existence of consumer countries that use demand-side policies to reduce
emissions, makes the producer country care about the stock of greenhouse gases,
because it fears for its future profits.
Note that letting the producer country care about the climate would not affect
the strategic effect stated in Proposition 1. However, the reduction in production
due to this strategic effect would then come in addition to the reduction due to the
producer country’s own harm from the stock of greenhouse gases in both periods.
Through comparative statics, the following subsection investigates how the strate-
gic effect stated in Proposition 1 depends upon the parameters of the model.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In order to facilitate the investigation of comparative statics, three simplifying as-
sumptions are made.
1. It is assumed that βi = 0 ∀ i ∈ N . This removes the effect on first period
demand through the effect on x2 of the parameter in question. For the propo-
sition concerning second period harm, it also removes the direct effect on first
period demand of greater harm from emissions.
2. It is assumed that the second-period harm function is quadratic, and that
H ′′2i = h2i, where h2i > 0 is a parameter.
3. It is assumed that the second-period utility function is quadratic, and that
U ′′2i = u2i, where u2i < 0 is a parameter.
The first result of this subsection concerns the the producer country’s discount
factor β:
Proposition 2. If the producer country puts greater weight on future welfare, e.g.
its discount factor β is higher, it reduces production more:
dx1
dβ
< 0
Proof. This is proven in Appendix A.1.
The producer country reduces production because it cares about its welfare next
period. If it cares more about its welfare next period, it will reduce production more.
The second result concerns the effect of a higher second period marginal cost of
production. To facilitate this analysis, let the second period cost function, C2, be
quadratic, e.g. that C2 = 12c2(x
S
2 )
2, where c2 > 0 is a parameter.
19
Proposition 3. If the second period marginal cost of production increases (de-
creases), the producer country reduces (increases) second-period production and in-
creases (reduces) first-period production:
dx2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
x1
< 0 and
dx1
dc2
> 0
Proof. This is proven in Appendix A.2.
It is rather intuitive that the producer country reduces second-period production
when the second period cost of production increases. But with fewer units produced
and sold in the second period, the loss from a lower price due to higher first-period
emissions is smaller. Thus, the producer country also chooses to produce and emit
more in the first period.
The third result of this subsection concerns the fraction of first-period emissions
that remains in the atmosphere in the second period, which is given by the survival
rate δ. A higher δ affects the strategic effect presented in Proposition 1 in two ways.
The second-period quantity is reduced, and the effect of higher first-period emissions
on the second-period price is amplified.
The quantity effect makes the producer country reduce first period production
less, since there are fewer second-period units on which it would lose from a price
increase caused by higher first-period emissions.
On the other hand, the price effect makes the producer country reduce production
more, because the higher first-period emissions causes a greater price increase in the
second period.
The following proposition states under which conditions either of the effects
dominates. Also, from the proof of the proposition it can be seen how the quantity
and price effects are identified and signed. Here,W ′′2 = 2p′1+x1p′′1−C ′′1+β dx2dx1
∂p2
∂x1
< 0
is the second-period objective function of the producer country, twice differentiated
with respect to xS1 .
Proposition 4. If a greater part of first-period emissions remains in the atmosphere
in the second period, because the survival rate δ is higher, the producer country
reduces first period production more, e.g. dx1dδ < 0, if
x2 > x1(W
′′
2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
and less, e.g. dx1dδ > 0, if
x2 < x1(W
′′
2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
Proof. This is proven in Appendix A.3.
These conditions have a clear intuition. A large x2 means that there are many
second period units on which the producer country would lose from a higher price.
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This strengthens the price effect.
A large x1 implies that an increase in δ causes a big increase in the second
period stock of greenhouse gases, and this causes a large reduction in second-period
consumption. This strengthens the quantity effect. Note that ∂p2∂x1 is independent of
x1 when utility and harm functions are quadratic. This is commented in the proof.
A big ∂p2∂x1 means that the loss from a higher second-period price is reduced more
when the second-period quantity is reduced because of a higher δ, since the loss on
each unit is greater. Thus, this strengthens the quantity effect.
Finally, the quantity reduction is small if marginal welfare increases rapidly when
quantity is reduced, e.g. W ′′2 is big. Thus, a big W ′′2 weakens the quantity effect.
The last result concerns a consumer country’s marginal harm from emissions,
and how rapidly it increases. A higher h2i also affect the strategic effect presented
in Proposition 1 in two ways, just like a higher δ: The second-period quantity is
reduced, and the effect of higher first-period emissions on the second-period price is
amplified.
The quantity effect is the same as when the consequences of a higher δ was
investigated: It makes the producer country reduce first period production less,
since there are fewer second-period units on which it would lose from a price increase
caused by higher first-period emissions.
But the price effect now actually consists of two effects, which both pull in the
same direction. First, a higher h2i implies that country i would reduce second-period
consumption more if first-period emissions were to increase. Second, a higher h2i
does also imply that country i is less willing to increase consumption when the price
is reduced, and thus the price must be reduced more for the consumers to be willing
to buy the same quantity of fossil fuels when first-period emissions increase.
Proposition 5. If harm from emissions increases more rapidly, the producer country
will reduce first-period emissions more, e.g. dx1dh2i < 0, if
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1
< −x2 d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
and less, , e.g. dx1dh2i > 0, if
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1
> −x2 d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
Proof. This is proven in Appendix A.4.
The left hand side of these inequalities represents the quantity effect, while the
right hand side represents the price effect.
As discussed in Section 5, if further work was to be done on this model, a priority
would be to express the conditions of Propositions 4 and 5 in terms of exogenous
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parameters.
In the introduction to this section, a restricted type of climate coalition among
consumer countries was mentioned. Countries would take into account the external
effect of emissions on each other, but would still take the price as given such that
there were no terms-of-trade effects. It should be noted here that the formation of
such a coalition would imply that the marginal harm of each country would increase
more rapidly.
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4 The Nature of Future Climate Policy Matters
for Emissions Today
In this section, I develop a model that is related to the model in Section 3, but which
allows for analysis of the effect of the nature of future climate policy on consumption
and production today.
In this model, there are NpD + N
m
D consumer countries. N
p
D of them take the
price as given, and do not care about the climate. The remaining NmD of them do
not take the price as given, but do care about the climate.
There are NpS +N
m
S producer countries. N
p
S of them take the price as given, and
do not care about the climate. The remaining NmS of them do not take the price as
given, but do care about the climate.
Thus, there are NpD + N
p
S countries that take the price and given, and do not
care about the climate, and NmD +N
m
S countries that do not take the price as given,
but do care about the climate.
The price-setter countries could be thought of as large countries, or coalitions of
countries.
The price-taker countries could be thought of as small countries which due to
their size take the price as given. Although it is not modeled, it could also be that
some of these small countries are hurt by climate change, but that they due to their
size take emissions as given and do not see how their own consumption or production
contribute to the stock of greenhouse gases.
The price-taking countries are introduced first, then the price-setting countries.
Consumer country i is a price-taker, and its utility from consuming xDpti fossil
fuels at time t, t = 1, 2, is given by the function Uti(x
Dp
ti ), which is increasing and
concave. Fossil fuels are bought at a price pt. Country i’s expenses on fossil fuels is
given by ptx
Dp
ti , and its welfare decreases linearly in these expenses.
Producer country k is a price-taker, and its cost of producing xSptk fossil fuels at
time t, t = 1, 2, is given by the function Ctk(x
Sp
tk ), which is increasing and convex.
Fossil fuels are sold at a price pt. Country k’s income from the sale of fossil fuels is
given by ptx
Sp
2k , and its welfare increases linearly in this income.
The price-setters are hurt by the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In
the first period, this stock is given by the first-period equilibrium quantity of fossil
fuels, xeq1 . In the second period, a fraction δ of these greenhouse gases are still in
the atmosphere. Also, second-period emissions of greenhouse gases are added to the
stock. Thus, the second period stock of greenhouse gases is given by δxeq1 + x
eq
2 ,
where xeq2 is the second-period equilibrium quantity of fossil fuels.
Consumer country j is a price-setter, and its utility from consuming xDtj fossil
fuels at time t, t = 1, 2, is given by the function Utj(xDtj), which is increasing and
concave. Fossil fuels are bought at a price pt. Country j’s expenses on fossil fuels
is given by ptxDtj , and its welfare decreases linearly in these expenses. Country j’s
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harm from the stock of greenhouse gases at time t is given by a function Htj of the
stock, and Htj is increasing and convex.
Producer country l is a price-setter, and its cost of producing xStl fossil fuels at
time t, t = 1, 2, is given by the function Ctl(xStl), which is increasing and convex.
Fossil fuels are sold at a price pt. Country l’s income from the sale of fossil fuels is
given by ptxS2l, and its welfare increases linearly in this income. Country l’s harm
from the stock of greenhouse gases at time t is given by a function Htl of the stock,
and Htl is increasing and convex.
Note that when I refer to some of the countries as price-setters, what is meant
is that they take into account how their chosen quantities affect the price, given
the quantities chosen by other countries. They do not actually set the equilibrium
price. The equilibrium price is the price that clears the market, given the equilibrium
quantities of each price-setting country.
The model is solved by backward induction.
4.1 Second-Period Optimization
In the second period, each price-taking consumer country maximizes welfare given
the price, p2. For each consumer country, this defines demand as a function of the
price. Aggregate demand from the price-taking consumer countries is given by the
sum of demand from all NpD of these countries. Thus, aggregate demand is also a
function of the price.
Similarly, each price-taking producer country maximizes welfare given the price,
p2. For each producer country, this defines supply as a function of the price. Aggre-
gate supply from the price-taking producer countries is given by the sum of supply
from all NpS of these countries. Thus, aggregate supply is also a function of the price.
The price that clears the market is the one that makes net supply from the
NpD + N
p
S price-taking countries equal to net demand from the N
m
D + N
m
S price-
setting countries.
Thus, when the price-setting countries maximize their welfare, they know which
price they will have to pay, or will receive, depending on their chosen quantity, given
the quantities set by the other price-setting countries.
It is also shown how higher first-period emissions affects the price a price-setting
country will have to pay, or will receive, for a certain quantity of fossil fuels, in the
second period.
Price-Taking Consumer Countries
Consumer country i chooses its consumption of fossil fuels, xDp2i , to maximize welfare.
The price, p2, is taken as given. The maximization problem:
max
xDp2i
U2i(x
Dp
2i )− p2xDp2i
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First order condition:
U ′2i(x
Dp
2i )− p2 = 0 (7)
This defines xDp2i (p2), country i’s demand for fossil fuels as a function of the price.
At the optimum, marginal utility from the consumption of fossil fuels is equal to the
price.
The aggregate demand function of the price-taking consumer countries is xDp2 (p2) ≡∑
i x
Dp
2i (p2).
Price-Taking Producer Countries
Consumer country k chooses its production of fossil fuels, xSp2k , to maximize welfare.
The price, p2, is taken as given. The maximization problem:
max
xSp2k
p2kx
Sp
2k − C2k(xSp2k )
First order condition:
p2 − C ′2k(xSp2k ) = 0 (8)
This defines xSp2k (p2), country k’s supply of fossil fuels as a function of the price.
At the optimum, the marginal cost of production of fossil fuels is equal to the price.
The aggregate supply function of the price-taking producer countries is xSp2 (p2) ≡∑
k x
Sp
2k (p2).
Market Clearing
The price that clears the market is the one that makes net supply from the NpD+N
p
S
price-taking countries, xSp2 (p2) + x
Dp
2 (p2), equal to net demand from the N
m
D +N
m
S
price-setting countries. Let demand from the price-setting countries be given by
xD2 ≡
∑
j x
D
2j , and supply by x
S
2 ≡
∑
l x
S
2l. The market clearing condition:
xD2 + x
Dp
2 (p2) = x
S
2 + x
Sp
2 (p2) (9)
Define net demand from the price-setting countries as xDnet2 ≡ xD2 −xS2 . Then, the
market clearing condition defines p2(xDnet2 ), the market clearing price as a function of
net demand from the price-setting countries. This is better seen from a reformulation
of the market clearing condition:
xSp2 (p2)− xDp2 (p2) = xD2 − xS2 ≡ xDnet2
The market clearing price must increase if net demand from the price-setting
countries increase, since a higher price is needed for the price-taking consumer coun-
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tries to consume less, and the price-taking producer countries to produce more. This
follows from differentiation of the market clearing condition, Equation (9), with re-
spect to xDnet2 :
dp2
dxDnet2
=
1
dxS2
dp2
− dx
Dp
2
dp2
> 0
Thus, when the price-setting consumer countries decide upon their consumption
of fossil fuels, they know that higher consumption implies a higher price on their
inframarginal units. Similarly, the price-setting producer countries know that higher
production implies a lower price on their inframarginal units.
Next, it is derived how the second-period quantity of fossil fuels is affected by a
marginal increase in consumption or production by the price-setting countries, when
the quantities set by other price-setting countries are held constant.
It is clear that given a set of quantities (xD2 , xS2 ) for the price-setting countries,
the market clearing price will adjust to equate consumption with production. Thus,
the total second-period consumption and production of fossil fuels can be written as
a function xtot2 (xD2 , xS2 ) ≡ xD2 + xDp2
(
p2(x
Dnet
2 )
)
= xS2 + x
Sp
2
(
p2(x
Dnet
2 )
)
.
It then follows that the partial effect on total consumption and production, of
higher consumption by the price-setting consumer countries, can by found by partial
differentiation of xtott (xD2 , xS2 ):
∂xtot2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
∂xD2
= 1 +
∂xDp2
∂p2
dp2
dxDnet2︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
=
∂xSp2
∂p2
dp2
dxDnet2
> 0
Unsurprisingly, total consumption and production increases when consumption
by the price-setting countries increase. But the increase is not one-to-one, since the
price-taking consumers reduce their consumption.
And similarly, regarding the partial effect on total consumption and production,
of higher production by the price-setting producer countries:
∂xtot2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
∂xS2
= 1− ∂x
Sp
2
∂p2
dp2
dxDnet2︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
= −∂x
Dp
2
∂p2
dp2
dxDnet2
> 0
Total consumption and production increases when production by the price-setting
countries increase. But the increase is not one-to-one, since the price-taking produc-
ers reduce their production.
Price-Setting Consumer Countries
The price-setting consumer countries do not take the price as given, only the quanti-
ties set by other price-setting countries. As shown, when the price-setting consumer
countries decide upon their consumption of fossil fuels, they know that higher con-
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sumption implies a higher price on their inframarginal units.
Thus, when choosing the optimal quantity, the price-setting consumer countries
must balance the net utility from another unit of fossil fuels against the loss from
having to pay a higher price on inframarginal units.
Furthermore, they have to take into account how their consumption of fossil
fuels contribute to the stock of greenhouse gases, which they take harm from. The
maximization problem for country j, a price-setting consumer country, is then:
max
xD2j
U2j(x
D
2j)− p2(xDnet2 )xD2j −H2j
(
δxeq1 + x
tot
2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
)
First order condition:
U ′2j − p2 − xD2j
dp2
dxDnet2
−H ′2j
∂xtot2
∂xD2
= 0 (10)
This defines the optimal second-period consumption of fossil fuels by consumer
country j as xDm2j
(
xeq1 | xD2,−j , xS2
)
, a function of the first-period quantity xeq1 , given
the quantities set by the other price-setting consumer countries, xD2,−j , and the quan-
tities set by the price-setting producer countries, xS2 .
The two first terms represent the net utility from a marginal increase in consump-
tion, while the third term represents the loss from a higher price on inframarginal
units.
The last term represents the harm from the increase in the stock of greenhouse
gases that this marginal increase in consumption leads to. As shown, emissions
increase less than one-to-one with the increase in country j’s consumption, since the
price-taking consumer countries reduce their consumption when the price increases
to clear the market.
Furthermore, the consumption of the price-setting consumer countries depends
on first-period emissions, since these contribute to the second period stock of green-
house gases. The following lemma establishes the effect of higher first-period emis-
sions on the consumption of a price-taking consumer country, given the quantities
set by other price-setting countries.
For notational simplicity, let
W2j(x
D
2j) ≡ U2j(xD2j)− p2(xDnet2 )xD2j −H2j
(
δxeq1 + x
tot
2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
)
Then, W ′2j and W
′′
2j refer to the first and second derivative, respectively, of
consumer country j’s objective function.
Note that it is assumed that the second order condition for a maximum holds,
e.g. that W ′′2j < 0 for country j.
Lemma 3. Higher first-period emissions reduces the second-period consumption of a
price-setting consumer country, given the quantities set by other price-setting coun-
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tries:
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
< 0
This reduction is bigger if more of the first-period emissions remain in the atmo-
sphere in the second period, e.g. if the fraction δ is higher.
Proof. Differentiation of the consumer country first order condition, Equation (10),
with respect to xeq1 , keeping constant the quantities set by other price-setting coun-
tries, yields:
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
=
δH ′′2j
∂xtot2
∂xD2
W ′′2j
< 0
It is evident that consumption is reduced more if δ is larger.
A marginal increase in first-period emissions increases the second period stock of
greenhouse gases by a fraction δ, which increases the price-setting consumer coun-
tries’ marginal harm from consumption of a given quantity of fossil fuels. Thus,
marginal welfare from the consumption of a given quantity of fossil fuels is lower,
and the price-setting consumer countries choose to consume less fossil fuels.
The effect of first-period emissions on second-period emissions is of course stronger
if more of the first-period emissions remain in the atmosphere in the second period.
Price-Setting Producer Countries
The price-setting producer countries do not take the price as given, only the quanti-
ties set by other price-setting countries. As shown, when the price-setting producer
countries decide upon their production of fossil fuels, they know that higher produc-
tion implies a lower price on their inframarginal units.
Thus, when choosing the optimal quantity, the price-setting producer countries
must balance the profit from producing and selling another unit of fossil fuels against
the loss from being paid a lower price for inframarginal units.
Furthermore, they have to take into account how their production of fossil fu-
els contribute to the stock of greenhouse gases, which they take harm from. The
maximization problem for country l, a price-setting producer country, is then:
max
xS2l
p2lx
S
2l − C2l(xS2l)−H2l
(
xeq1 + x
tot
2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
)
First order condition:
p2 − C ′2l − xS2l
dp2
dxDnet2
−H ′2l
∂xtot2
∂xS2
= 0 (11)
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This defines the second-period production of fossil fuels by producer country l as
xSm2j
(
xeq1 | xD2 , xS2,−l
)
, a function of the first-period quantity xeq1 , given the quantities
set by the other price-setting producer countries, xS2,−l, and the quantities set by the
price-setting consumer countries, x2,D.
The two first terms represent the profit from a marginal increase in production,
while the third term represents the loss from a lower price on inframarginal units.
The last term represents the harm from the increase in the stock of greenhouse
gases that this marginal increase in production leads to. As shown, emissions increase
less than one-to-one with the increase in country l’s production, since the price-
taking producer countries reduce their production when the price is reduced in order
to clear the market.
Furthermore, the production of the price-setting producer countries depends on
first-period emissions, since these contribute to the second period stock of greenhouse
gases. The following lemma establishes the effect of higher first-period emissions on
the production of a price-taking producer country, given the quantities set by other
price-setting countries.
For notational simplicity, let
W2l(x
S
2l) ≡ p2lxS2l − C2l(xS2l)−H2l
(
xeq1 + x
tot
2 (x
D
2 , x
S
2 )
)
Then, W ′2l and W
′′
2l refer to the first and second derivative, respectively, of pro-
ducer country l’s objective function.
Note that it is assumed that the second order condition for a maximum holds,
e.g. that W ′′2l < 0 for country l.
Lemma 4. Higher first-period emissions reduces the second-period production of a
price-setting producer country, given the quantities set by other price-setting coun-
tries:
∂xSm2j
∂xeq1
< 0
This reduction is bigger if more of the first-period emissions remain in the atmo-
sphere in the second period, e.g. if the fraction δ is higher.
Proof. Differentiation of the producer country first order condition, Equation (11),
with respect to xeq1 , keeping constant the quantities set by other price-setting coun-
tries, yields:
∂xSm2j
∂xeq1
=
δH ′′2j
∂xtot2
∂xS2
W ′′2j
< 0
It is evident that production is reduced more if δ is larger.
A marginal increase in first-period emissions increases the second period stock of
greenhouse gases by a fraction δ, which increases the price-setting producer countries’
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marginal harm from production of a given quantity of fossil fuels. Thus, marginal
welfare from the production of a given quantity of fossil fuels is lower, and the
price-setting producer countries choose to produce less fossil fuels.
The effect of first-period emissions on second-period emissions is of course stronger
if more of the first-period emissions remain in the atmosphere in the second period.
The Second-Period Equilibrium Price
The market clearing condition defined the price that clears the market as a function
of net demand from the price-setting countries. If net demand from the price-
setting countries are given by their optimal quantities, the market clearing condition
defines the second-period equilibrium price, peq2 . The market clearing condition, with
optimal quantities set by the price-setters:∑
j
xDm2j
(
xeq1 | xD2,−j , xS2
)
+ xDp2 (p
eq
2 ) =
∑
l
xSm2l
(
xeq1 | xD2 , xS2,−l
)
+ xSp2 (p
eq
2 ) (12)
This defines peq2 (x
eq
1 ), the equilibrium price as a function of first-period emissions,
xeq1 .
The next lemma concerns the effect of higher first-period emissions on the second-
period price. Since the price is a function of net demand from the price-setting
countries, xDnet2 , the change in the price due higher first-period emissions is given
by the change in xDnet2 . The change in xDnet2 depends on the partial reductions
in consumption and production due to higher first-period emissions, dampened or
propagated by second order effects.
The partial reduction in consumption due to a marginal increase in first-period
emissions is given by the sum of partial reductions by price-setting consumer coun-
tries:
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
A reduction in consumption by a price-setting consumer country would make
other price-setting consumer countries increase their consumption, while price-setting
producer countries would reduce their production. Thus, the change in xDnet2 due to
the partial reduction in consumption is given by:
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
[
1 +
∑
u6=j
∂xDm2u
∂xD2,−u
+
∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xD2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ ψDj
]
=
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
[1 + ψDj ]
The partial reduction in production due to a marginal increase in first-period
emissions is given by the sum of partial reductions by price-setting production coun-
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tries:
∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
A reduction in production by a price-setting producer country would make other
price-setting producer countries increase their production, while price-setting con-
sumer countries would reduce their consumption. Thus, the change in xDnet2 due to
the partial reduction in production is given by:
−
∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
[
1 +
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xS2
+
∑
v 6=l
∂xSm2v
∂xS2,−v︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ ψSl
]
= −
∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
[1 + ψSl ]
Lemma 5. A marginal increase in first-period emissions makes the second-period
equilibrium price decrease (increase) if the reduction in xDnet2 due to the partial re-
duction in consumption, is bigger (smaller) than the increase in xDnet2 due to the
partial reduction in production:
dpeq2
dx1
< 0 if
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
(1 + ψDj )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
(1 + ψSl )
∣∣∣∣∣
dpeq2
dx1
< 0 if
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
(1 + ψDj )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
(1 + ψSl )
∣∣∣∣∣
Proof. This follows from differentiation of the second-period equilibrium condition,
Equation (9), with respect to x1. Differentiation yields:
dpeq2
dx1
=
dpeq2
dxDnet2
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
[1 + ψDj ]−
∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
[1 + ψSl ]

The term in parenthesizes, the change in xDnet2 , is negative if the reduction in
net demand due to the partial reduction in consumption, is bigger than the increase
in net demand due to the partial reduction in production, e.g.:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
(1 + ψDj )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
(1 + ψSl )
∣∣∣∣∣
The term in parenthesizes, the change in xDnet2 , is positive if the reduction in net
demand due to the partial reduction in consumption, is smaller than the increase in
net demand due to the partial reduction in production, e.g.:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
∂xDm2j
∂xeq1
(1 + ψDj )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
l
∂xSm2l
∂xeq1
(1 + ψSl )
∣∣∣∣∣
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Lastly, the second-period equilibrium quantity of fossil fuels produced and con-
sumed is given by xeq2 , which is a function of first-period emissions, x
eq
1 . It follows
from the analysis above that the second-period quantity of fossil fuels is reduced if
first-period emissions increase:
dxeq2
dxeq1
< 0
4.2 First-Period Optimization
In the first period, each price-taking consumer country maximizes welfare given the
price, p1. For each consumer country, this defines demand as a function of the price.
Aggregate demand from the price-taking consumer countries is given by the sum of
demand from all NpD of these countries. Thus, aggregate demand is also a function
of the price.
Similarly, each price-taking producer country maximizes welfare given the price,
p1. For each producer country, this defines supply as a function of the price. Aggre-
gate supply from the price-taking producer countries is given by the sum of supply
from all NpS of these countries. Thus, aggregate supply is also a function of the price.
The price that clears the market is the one that makes net supply from the
NpD + N
p
S price-taking countries equal to net demand from the N
m
D + N
m
S price-
setting countries.
Thus, when the price-setting countries maximize their welfare, they know which
price they will have to pay, or will receive, depending on their chosen quantity, given
the quantities set by the other price-setting countries.
Each price-setting country take into account how first period consumption of
fossil fuels affect their own welfare in the second period.
Price-Taking Consumer Countries
Consumer country i chooses its consumption of fossil fuels, xDp1i , to maximize welfare.
The price, p1, is taken as given. The maximization problem:
max
xDp1i
U1i(x
Dp
1i )− p1xDp1i
First order condition:
U ′1i(x
Dp
1i )− p1 = 0 (13)
This defines xDp1i (p1), country i’s demand for fossil fuels as a function of the price.
At the optimum, marginal utility from the consumption of fossil fuels is equal to the
price.
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The aggregate demand function of the price-taking consumer countries is xDp1 (p1) ≡∑
i x
Dp
1i (p1).
Price-Taking Producer Countries
Consumer country k chooses its production of fossil fuels, xSp1k , to maximize welfare.
The price, p1, is taken as given. The maximization problem:
max
xSp1k
p1kx
Sp
1k − C1k(xSp1k )
First order condition:
p1 − C ′1k(xSp1k ) = 0 (14)
This defines xSp1k (p1), country k’s supply of fossil fuels as a function of the price.
At the optimum, the marginal cost of production of fossil fuels is equal to the price.
The aggregate supply function of the price-taking producer countries is xSp1 (p1) ≡∑
k x
Sp
1k (p1).
Market Clearing
The price that clears the market is the one that makes net supply from the NpD+N
p
S
price-taking countries, xSp1 (p1) + x
Dp
1 (p1), equal to net demand from the N
m
D +N
m
S
price-setting countries. Let demand from the price-setting countries be given by
xD1 ≡
∑
j x
D
1j , and supply by x
S
1 ≡
∑
l x
S
1l. The market clearing condition:
xD1 + x
Dp
1 (p1) = x
S
1 + x
Sp
1 (p1) (15)
Define net demand from the price-setting countries as xDnet1 ≡ xD1 −xS1 . Then, the
market clearing condition defines p1(xDnet1 ), the market clearing price as a function of
net demand from the price-setting countries. This is better seen from a reformulation
of the market clearing condition:
xS1 (p1)− xDp1 (p1) = xD1 − xS1 ≡ xDnet1
The market clearing price must increase if net demand from the price-setting
countries increase, since a higher price is needed for the price-taking consumer coun-
tries to consume less, and the price-taking producer countries to produce more.
This follows from differentiation of the market clearing condition, Equation (15),
with respect to xDnet1 :
dp1
dxDnet1
=
1
dxS1
dp1
− dx
Dp
1
dp1
> 0
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Thus, when the price-setting consumer countries decide upon their consumption
of fossil fuels, they know that higher consumption implies a higher price on their
inframarginal units. Similarly, the price-setting producer countries know that higher
production implies a lower price on their inframarginal units.
Next, it is derived how the second-period quantity of fossil fuels is affected by a
marginal increase in consumption or production by the price-setting countries, when
the quantities set by other price-setting countries are held constant.
It is clear that given a set of quantities (xD1 , xS1 ) for the price-setting countries,
the market clearing price will adjust to equate consumption with production. Thus,
the total second-period consumption and production of fossil fuels can be written as
a function xtot1 (xD1 , xS1 ) ≡ xD1 + xDp1
(
p1(x
Dnet
1 )
)
= xS1 + x
Sp
1
(
p1(x
Dnet
1 )
)
.
It then follows that the partial effect on total consumption and production, of
higher consumption by the price-setting consumer countries, can by found by partial
differentiation of xtott (xD1 , xS1 ):
∂xtot1 (x
D
1 , x
S
1 )
∂xD1
= 1 +
∂xDp1
∂p1
dp1
dxDnet1
=
∂xSp1
∂p1
dp1
dxDnet1
> 0
Unsurprisingly, total consumption and production increases when consumption
by the price-setting countries increase. But the increase is not one-to-one, since the
price-taking consumers reduce their consumption.
And similarly, regarding the partial effect on total consumption and production,
of higher production by the price-setting producer countries:
∂xtot1 (x
D
1 , x
S
1 )
∂xS1
= 1− ∂x
Sp
1
∂p1
dp1
dxDnet1
= −∂x
Dp
1
∂p1
dp1
dxDnet1
> 0
Total consumption and production increases when production by the price-setting
countries increase. But the increase is not one-to-one, since the price-taking produc-
ers reduce their production.
Price-Setting Consumer Countries
The price-setting consumer countries do not take the price as given, only the quanti-
ties set by other price-setting countries. As shown, when the price-setting consumer
countries decide upon their consumption of fossil fuels, they know that higher con-
sumption implies a higher price on their inframarginal units.
Thus, when choosing the optimal quantity, the price-setting consumer countries
must balance the net utility from another unit of fossil fuels against the loss from
having to pay a higher price on inframarginal units.
Furthermore, they have to take into account how their consumption of fossil fuels
contribute to the stock of greenhouse gases, which they take harm from.
In the first period, the price-setting consumer countries must also take into ac-
count how first period emissions affect second period welfare, which is discounted at
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a rate β.
The maximization problem for country j, a price-setting consumer country, with
argument omitted for xtot1 (xD1 , xS1 ) to simplify notation, is then:
max
xD1j
U1j(x
D
1j)− p1(xDnet1 )xD1j −H1j
(
xtot1
)
+ β
[
U2j(x
Dm
2j )− peq2 (xtot1 )xDm2j −H2j
(
δxtot1 + x
eq
2 (x
tot
1 )
)]
First order condition:
U ′1j − p1 − xD1j
dp1
dxDnet1
−H ′1j
∂xtot1
∂xD1
+ β
[
(U ′2j − p2)
dxDm2j
dxeq1
− xDm2j
dpeq2
dxeq1
−H ′2j
(
δ +
dxeq2
dxeq1
)]
∂xtot1
∂xD1
= 0
The first four terms of the first order condition concern the first period welfare
from the consumption of fossil fuels, and have the same interpretation as their second
period counterparts.
The term beginning with β represents the effect of higher first-period emissions
on second period welfare. However, the producer country knows that for any level of
first-period emissions, it will choose the optimal quantity in the second period. Thus,
a marginal change in its own consumption does not affect welfare, since marginal
welfare is zero at the optimum. This is given by the second-period first order con-
dition for a price-setting consumer country, Equation (10), which can be used to
simplify the second-period first order condition:
U ′1j − p1 − xD1j
dp1
dxDnet1
−H ′1j
∂xtot1
∂xD1
− β
[
xDm2j
dpeq2,−j
dxeq1
+H ′2j
(
δ +
dxeq2,−j
dxeq1
)]
∂xtot1
∂xD1
= 0
(16)
Where
dxeq2,−j
dxeq1
≡ dx
eq
2
dxeq1
− ∂xtot2
∂xD2
dxDm2j
dxeq1
and
dpeq2,−j
dxeq1
≡ dp
eq
2
dxeq1
− ∂p2
∂xDnet2
dxDm2j
dxeq1
.
This defines the optimal first period consumption of fossil fuels by consumer coun-
try j as xDm1j
(
xD1,−j , x
S
1
)
, a function of the quantities set by the other price-setting
consumer countries, xD1,−j , and the quantities set by the price-setting producer coun-
tries, xS1 .
Evidently, a price-setting consumer country cares about how its consumption in
the first period contributes to a higher stock of greenhouse gases because itself takes
harm from climate change.
But in addition, such a country does also take into account how first-period
emissions affects the price it has to pay for inframarginal units in the second period.
Note that it is only the price change due to the policies of the other countries that
matter, e.g. the demand-side policies of the other consumer countries, and the
supply-side policies of the producer countries.
The following proposition establishes how the first-period consumption of a price-
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setting consumer country depends on the climate policies of other countries:
Proposition 6. Price-setting consumer countries increase (reduce) first-period con-
sumption if the second-period response of other countries to higher first-period emis-
sions has a negative (positive) effect on the second-period price.
Proof. This follows from the first order condition, Equation (16), and Lemma 5 and
its proof.
Note that it could very well be the case that higher first-period emissions led to
a lower second-period price, but that there nevertheless were price-setting consumer
countries which reduced their consumption due to the effect stated in Proposition 6.
This is because each country only cares about the policies of other countries.
The demand-side policy of a large consumer country that cares strongly about
the climate can cause the actual effect of higher emissions on the price to be negative,
as the same time as this country reduces its first period consumption because the
effect on the price due to the policies of other countries is negative.
Price-Setting Producer Countries
The price-setting producer countries do not take the price as given, only the quanti-
ties set by other price-setting countries. As shown, when the price-setting producer
countries decide upon their production of fossil fuels, they know that higher produc-
tion implies a lower price on their inframarginal units.
Thus, when choosing the optimal quantity, the price-setting producer countries
must balance the net utility from another unit of fossil fuels against the loss from
having to pay a lower price on inframarginal units.
Furthermore, they have to take into account how their production of fossil fuels
contribute to the stock of greenhouse gases, which they take harm from.
In the first period, the price-setting producer countries must also take into ac-
count how first period emissions affect second period welfare, which is discounted at
a rate β.
The maximization problem for country l, a price-setting producer country, with
arguments omitted for xtot1 (xD1 , xS1 ) to simplify notation, is then:
max
xS1l
p1(x
Dnet
1 )x
S
1l − C1l(xS1l)−H1l
(
xtot1
)
+ β
[
peq2 (x
tot
1 )x
Sm
2l − C2l(xSm2l )−H2l
(
δxtot1 + x
eq
2 (x
tot
1 )
)]
First order condition:
p1 − C ′1l − xS1l
dp1
dxDnet1
−H ′1l
∂xtot1
∂xS1
+ β
[
(p2 − C ′2l)
dxSm2l
dxeq1
+ xSm2l
dpeq2
dxeq1
−H ′2l
(
δ +
dxeq2
dxeq1
)]
∂xtot1
∂xD1
= 0
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The first four terms of the first order condition concern the first period welfare
from the production of fossil fuels, and have the same interpretation as their second
period counterparts.
The term beginning with β represents the effect of higher first-period emissions
on second period welfare. However, the producer country knows that for any level of
first-period emissions, it will choose the optimal quantity in the second period. Thus,
a marginal change in its own production does not affect welfare, since marginal wel-
fare is zero at the optimum. This is given by the second-period first order condition
for a price-setting producer country, Equation (11), which can be used to simplify
the second-period first order condition:
p1 − C ′1l − xS1l
dp1
dxDnet1
−H ′1l
∂xtot1
∂xS1
+ β
[
xSm2l
dpeq2,−l
dxeq1
−H ′2l
(
δ +
dpeq2,−l
dxeq1
)]
∂xtot1
∂xD1
= 0
(17)
Where
dxeq2,−l
dxeq1
≡ dx
eq
2
dxeq1
− ∂xtot2
∂xS2
dxSm2l
dxeq1
and
dpeq2,−l
dxeq1
≡ dp
eq
2
dxeq1
− ∂p2
∂xDnet2
dxSm2l
dxeq1
.
This defines the first period production of fossil fuels by producer country l as
xSm1l
(
xD1 , x
S
1,−l
)
, a function of the quantities set by the other price-setting producer
countries, xS1,−l, and the quantities set by the price-setting consumer countries, x1,
D.
Evidently, a price-setting producer country cares about how its production in
the first period contributes to a higher stock of greenhouse gases because itself takes
harm from climate change.
But in addition, such a country does also take into account how first-period
emissions affects the price it will receive for inframarginal units in the second period.
Note that it is only the price change due to the policies of the other countries
that matters, e.g. the supply-side policies of the other producer countries, and the
demand-side policies of the producer countries.
The following proposition establishes how the first-period production of a price-
setting producer country depends on the climate policies of other countries:
Proposition 7. Price-setting producer countries reduce (increase) first-period pro-
duction if the second-period response of other countries to higher first-period emis-
sions has a negative (positive) effect on the second-period price.
Proof. This follows from the first order condition, Equation (17), and Lemma 5 and
its proof.
Note that it could very well be the case that higher first-period emissions led to
a higher second-period price, but that there nevertheless were price-setting producer
countries which reduced their production due to the effect stated in Proposition 7.
This is because each country only cares about the policies of other countries.
The supply-side policy of a large producer country that cares strongly about the
climate can cause the actual effect of higher emissions on the price to be negative,
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as the same time as this country reduces its first period consumption because the
effect on the price due to the policies of other countries is negative.
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5 Refinements and Possible Extensions
First, ideas for further work on the models of the thesis are presented. Then, a
possible extension which allows for countries which combine demand- and supply-side
policies is discussed. Finally, I draw up questions that could be answered through a
signaling model inspired by the results of my thesis, with private information about
the harm from the stock of greenhouse gases.
5.1 Refinement of the Current Models
With regard to the first model, presented in Section 3, a first task would be to
rebuild the model around a producer country that sets the price, not the quantity.
This would remove the need for the somewhat unsatisfactory approximation that
had to be done to solve the model with the current setup. This new setup would
likely yield similar results, but in a more consistent framework.
Next, with the assumptions made about quadratic functions in the comparative
statics part, it should be possible to actually solve the model for x1 and x2, and
express these variables in terms of exogenous parameters. Then, the conditions in
Propositions 4 and 5 could expressed in terms of exogenous parameters. It would
then also be possible to determine whether the effects of these propositions are likely
to be of one sign or another, given reasonable parameter values.
Moreover, comparative statics should be carried out without the simplifying as-
sumption that consumer countries put zero weight on future welfare, e.g. βi = 0 ∀ i
should be dropped.
The second model, presented in Section 4, is probably the one with the greatest
potential. To my knowledge, this perspective is not investigated in the literature on
climate policies. A first task with respect to this model would be to make a version
with quadratic functions, and attempt to solve the model for all the endogenous
variables, in terms of exogenous parameters. Then, the conditions in Lemma 5
could be expressed in terms of parameters. Also, the precise conditions for the effect
of higher first-period emissions on the second-period price, as seen by a producer or
consumer country that does not take into account its own second-period policy, could
be precisely formulated. This would allow for a fruitful discussion of the interaction
between the number of countries in each group and their harm functions, among
other things.
The special case with identical countries in each group should also be explored.
This should allow for a particularly stark presentation of the results.
5.2 Countries Combining Policies
An extension of the second model should investigate the role of countries who both
consume and produce fossil fuels, and combine demand- and supply-side policies as
shown by Hoel (1994). Two questions have to be answered: How does such a country
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act strategically to affect the future decisions of other countries which use either
demand- or supply-side policies? And how does other countries act strategically
to affect the future decisions of a country that combines demand- and supply-side
policies?
The answer to the first question is likely that qualitatively, the first-period ac-
tions of such a country will be similar to those of a pure consumer or producer
country, depending on whether the country that combines policies is a net importer
or exporter. But this should be formally established. Sketching an answer to the
second question is not straightforward, but this is my hypothesis: The terms-of-
trade effects on the quantity set by such a country depends only on net imports or
exports, and are not directly affected by an increase in first-period emissions. Apart
from terms-of-trade effects, the composition of demand- and supply-side policies is
chosen to minimize carbon leakage. My hypothesis is that if first-period emissions
increase marginally, the reduce second-period consumption and production in such a
way that the effect on the second-period price is neutral. To summarize: Countries
that combine policies would themselves act strategically in similar ways as described
in this thesis, but their climate policies would not motivate such strategic actions
from other countries.
5.3 Asymmetric Information
If each country’s harm from emissions is private information, the results of the thesis
motivate an investigation of countries’ incentives to signal lower/higher harm from
emissions, given a preferred type of policy.
A country’s incentives to signal lower/higher harm from emissions, given a pre-
ferred type of policy, could be investigated in a two-period model where first-period
emissions affect second-period behavior through the stock of greenhouse gases, and
where countries base their beliefs about the second-period policies of other countries
upon the behavior they observe in the first period.
Label the country in question i, and let it be of type A, while the other type is
named B. Two questions would have to be resolved: 1. How would it affect the other
countries’ first-period behavior if country i could successfully signal lower/higher
harm? 2. How would country i be affected by these responses?
With respect to other countries of typeA, the conclusion seems relatively straight-
forward: Country i would have incentive to signal lower harm, thereby reducing the
amount of free-riding from other countries of type A, which otherwise would free-ride
both on country i’s future emissions reductions an the favorable effect of country
i’s future climate policies would have on the second-period price. Country i would
benefit directly from lower first-period emissions from the other countries of type A,
and indirectly through the favorable effect on the first-period price.
With respect to countries of type B, it seems to be more complicated. If country
i signaled lower harm, lower expected future emissions reductions due to country
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i’s policies would make countries of type B reduce first-period emissions. At the
same time, if the countries of type B believed that country i’s harm from emissions
was lower, they would not have to worry so much about higher first-period emissions
having an unfavorable effect on the second-period price through the policy of country
i.
Next, whether this ends with a reduction or increase in first-period emissions
from countries of type B, it is not clear which of these country i would prefer. A
reduction in emissions would be beneficial, while the unfavorable effect the climate
policy of countries of type B would have on the first-period price would be costly.
Thus, the answer to the first question asked would seem to depend upon the
countries of type B’s valuation of second-period emissions reductions versus unfa-
vorable effects on the second-period price, while the answer to the second question
would seem to depend on country i’s valuation of first-period emissions reductions
versus unfavorable effects on the first-period price.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, I have studied the strategic provision of a public good, when this
good can be provided in different ways, and contributors to the public good have
different preferences over the ways through which it can be provided. The public
good in question is reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, which can be achieved
both through demand- and supply-side climate policies.
It has been shown that countries that would benefit from a lower future price of
fossil fuels emit more if the future climate policy response has a negative effect on
the price, and less if the effect is positive. Similarly, countries that would benefit
from a higher future price of fossil fuels emit less if the future climate policy response
has a negative effect on the price, and more if the effect is positive.
The dynamic good problem among countries which prefer the same type of cli-
mate policy is aggravated when each country not only has incentive to free-ride on
the future emissions reductions of the others, but also benefits from the favorable
effect their climate policies have on the future price of fossil fuels.
However, the dynamic public good problem among countries which prefer differ-
ent types of policies is alleviated, since the the type of policy not preferred would
have an unfavorable effect on the future price of fossil fuels.
A next step would be to investigate how countries, and other agents, could take
into account, and exploit, such strategic effects. In Section 4, a signaling game
was proposed, with countries that prefer different climate policies, and have private
information about their harm from greenhouse gases.
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A Appendix: Proofs for Section 3
Here, proofs of the results from the comparative statics section are provided. First,
note that because of the quadratic utility and harm functions, ∂p2∂x1 depends only on
parameters, and is thus unaffected by a change in x1:
∂p2
∂x1
= −∂x
D
2
∂x1
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
= −
∑
i
δ
h2i
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂x1
<0
(∑
i
1
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂p2
<0
)−1
< 0
Second, let W1 and W2 be given by:
W1 ≡ p2(xS2 | x1)xS2 − C2(xS2 )
W2 ≡ p1(xS1 )xS1 − C1(xS1 ) + β [p2(x2 | x1)x2 − C2(x2)]
Then, the first order condition for the producer country’s maximization problem
in period t can be written as W ′t = 0, and the second order condition as W ′′t < 0.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiation of the first-period first order condition for the producer country,
Equation (3), with respect to β yields:
(2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 )
dx1
dβ
+ x2
∂p2
∂x1
+ β
dx2dβ ∂p2∂x1 + x2 ddβ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
 = 0 (18)
The second of the bracketed terms in Equation (18) is zero, because ∂p2∂x1 is a
constant which does not depend upon β.
dx2
dβ can be written as shown below, since x2 depends on β only through x1:
dx2
dβ
=
dx2
dx1
dx1
dβ
Then, Equation (18) can be rewritten as:(
2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 + β
dx2
dx1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′1 < 0
)
dx1
dβ
+ x2
∂p2
∂x1
= 0
This equation can then be solved for dx1dβ :
dx1
dβ
= x2
∂p2
∂x1︸︷︷︸
< 0
(−W ′′1 )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
< 0
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Here, W ′′1 < 0 by assumption, and it has been shown earlier that
∂p2
∂x1
< 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that for this proposition it was assumed that the second period cost function,
C2, is quadratic, e.g. that C2 = 12c2(x
S
2 )
2, where c2 > 0 is a parameter. Differentia-
tion of the first-period first order condition for the producer country, Equation (3),
with respect to c2 yields:
(2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 )
dx1
dc2
+ β
dx2dc2 ∂p2∂x1 + x2 ddc2
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
 = 0 (19)
The second of the bracketed terms in Equation (19) is zero, because ∂p2∂x1 is a
constant which does not depend upon c2.
dx2
dc2
can be expanded as shown below, since x2 depends on c2 both through its
direct effect on second-period production, and via its effect on x1:
dx2
dc2
=
dx2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
x1
+
dx2
dx1
dx1
dc2
Using the expanded version of dx2dc2 , Equation (19) can be rewritten as:(
2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 + β
dx2
dx1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′1 < 0
)
dx1
dc2
+ β
dx2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1
= 0
This equation can then be solved for dx1dc2 :
dx1
dc2
= β
dx2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
(−W ′′1 )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
> 0
Here, W ′′1 < 0 by assumption. That
∂p2
∂x1
< 0 has been shown earlier. That the
sign of dx2dc2
∣∣
x1
is negative is shown by differentiation of the second-period first order
condition for the producer country, Equation (3), with respect to c2, keeping x1
constant:
dx2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
x1
= x2
/(
2
∂p2
∂xS2
+ x2
∂2p2
∂(xS2 )
2
− c2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′2 < 0
)
< 0 (20)
48
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiation of the first-period first order condition for the producer country,
Equation (3), with respect to δ yields:
(2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 )
dx1
dδ
+ β
[
dx2
dδ
∂p2
∂x1
+ x2
d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)]
= 0 (21)
Here, dx2dδ can be expanded as shown below, since x2 depends on δ both through
its direct effect on second period demand, and via its effect on x1:
dx2
dδ
=
dx2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1
+
dx2
dx1
dx1
dδ
Using the expanded version of dx2dδ , Equation (21) can be rewritten as:(
2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 + β
dx2
dx1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′1 < 0
)
dx1
dδ
+ β
[
dx2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1
+ x2
d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)]
= 0
This equation can then be solved for dx1dδ :
dx1
dδ
=
β
[
dx2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ A > 0
+x2
d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ B < 0
](−W ′′1 )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
Here, W ′′1 < 0 by assumption. A and B represent the quantity and price effects,
respectively, mentioned in the introduction to the proposition. In the following, it
is shown how the signs of A and B are determined.
An increase in δ would affect the second-period equilibrium quantity, and thereby
the loss from a higher price on inframarginal units. This is represented by A. That
∂p2
∂x1
< 0 has been shown earlier. That the sign of dx2dδ
∣∣
x1
is negative is shown by
differentiation of the second-period first order condition for the producer country,
Equation (3), with respect to δ, keeping x1 constant:
dx2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1
= −
dp2dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1,x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+x2
d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂xS2
) ∣∣∣∣
x1,x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0

/(
2
∂p2
∂xS2
+ x2
∂2p2
∂(xS2 )
2
− C ′′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′2 < 0
)
< 0
(22)
Here, W ′′2 < 0 by assumption. That the first term of the numerator in Equa-
tion (22) is negative follows from differentiation of the second-period market clearing
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condition, Equation (2), with respect to δ, keeping x1 and x2 constant. This yields:
dp2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1,x2
= − ∂x
D
2
∂δ
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
= −
∑
i
h2ix1
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
< 0
Where ∂x
D
2
∂δ was found by differentiation of the second-period first order condition
for a consumer country, Equation (1), with respect to δ.
The second term of the numerator in Equation (22) is zero, because ∂p2
∂xS2
is a
constant which does not depend upon δ. This can be seen from differentiation of the
second-period market clearing condition, Equation (2), with respect to xS2 , which
yields:
∂p2
∂xS2
=
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
=
(∑
i
1
u2i − h2i
)−1
Thus, it has been shown that the sign of A is positive.
Next, it is shown that the sign of B is negative.
d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
=
d
dδ

∑
i
δ
h2i
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂x1
<0
(∑
i
1
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂p2
<0
)−1

= −
N∑
i
h2i
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
< 0
Thus, it has been shown that the sign of B is negative.
At last, using the expressions found so far, the conditions under which dx1dδ is
positive or negative are found. If it is positive, this is true:
dx2
dδ
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ A > 0
> −x2 d
dδ
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ B < 0
−
(
−
∑
i
h2ix1
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1)
(W ′′2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
> −x2
(
−
N∑
i
h2i
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1)
∑
i
h2ix1
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
(W ′′2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
> x2
N∑
i
h2i
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
x1
∑
i
h2i
u2i − h2i (W
′′
2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
< x2
N∑
i
h2i
u2i − h2i
x1(W
′′
2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
> x2
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Thus:
dx1
dδ
> 0 if x2 < x1(W ′′2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
And vice versa:
dx1
dδ
< 0 if x2 > x1(W ′′2 )
−1 ∂p2
∂x1
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Differentiation of the first-period first order condition for the producer country,
Equation (3), with respect to h2i yields:
(2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 )
dx1
dh2i
+ β
[
dx2
dh2i
∂p2
∂x1
+ x2
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)]
= 0 (23)
Each of the terms dx2dh2i and
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
can be expanded. dx2dh2i can be expanded
as shown below, since x2 depends on h2i both through its direct effect on second
period demand, and via its effect on x1:
dx2
dh2i
=
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
+
dx2
dx1
dx1
dh2i
Note that because of the quadratic utility and harm functions, ∂p2∂x1 depends only on
parameters, and is unaffected by a change in x1. This is the reason why ddh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
is not expanded in a similar way.
Using the expanded version of dx2dh2i , Equation (23) can be rewritten as:
(
2p′1 + x1p
′′
1 − C ′′1 + β
dx2
dx1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′1 < 0
)
dx1
dh2i
+ β
[
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1
+ x2
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)]
= 0
This equation can then be solved for dx1dh2i :
dx1
dh2i
=
β
[
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ C > 0
+x2
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ D < 0
](−W ′′1 )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
Here, W ′′1 < 0 by assumption. C and D represent the quantity and price effects,
respectively, mentioned in the introduction to the proposition. In the following, it
is shown how the signs of C and D are determined.
An increase in h2i would affect the second-period equilibrium quantity, and
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thereby the loss from a higher price on inframarginal units. This is represented
by C. That ∂p2∂x1 < 0 has been shown earlier. That the sign of
dx2
dh2i
∣∣
x1
is negative is
shown by differentiation of the second-period first order condition for the producer
country, Equation (3), with respect to h2i, keeping x1 constant:
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
= −
(
dp2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1,x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+x2
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂xS2
) ∣∣∣∣
x1,x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
)/(
2
∂p2
∂xS2
+ x2
∂2p2
∂(xS2 )
2
− C ′′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
= W ′′2 < 0
)
< 0
(24)
Here, W ′′2 < 0 by assumption. That the first term of the numerator in Equa-
tion (24) is negative follows from differentiation of the second-period market clearing
condition, Equation (2), with respect to h2i, keeping x1 and x2 constant. This yields:
dp2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1,x2
= − ∂x
D
2
∂h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
= − δx1 + x2
u2i − h2i
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
< 0
Where ∂x
D
2
∂h2i
was found by differentiation of the second-period first order condition
for consumer country i, Equation (1).
That the second term of the numerator in Equation (24) is negative, is seen from
differentiation of ∂p2
∂xS2
with respect to h2i, where the expression for ∂p2∂xS2
is found by
differentiation of the second-period market clearing condition, Equation (2), with
respect to xS2 :
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂xS2
) ∣∣∣∣
x1,x2
=
d
dh2i
(
1−∑Ni h2i (u2i − h2i)−1∑
i (u2i − h2i)−1
)
= −
[
(u2i − h2i)−1 + h2i(−1) (u2i − h2i)−2 (−1)
] [∑
i
(u2i − h2i)−1
]−1
+
[
1−
N∑
i
h2i (u2i − h2i)−1
]
(−1)
[∑
i
(u2i − h2i)−1
]−2
(−1) (u2i − h2i)−2 (−1)
= −
[
(u2i − h2i)−1 + h2i (u2i − h2i)−2
] [∑
i
(u2i − h2i)−1
]−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
−
[
1−
N∑
i
h2i (u2i − h2i)−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
[∑
i
(u2i − h2i)−1
]−2
(u2i − h2i)−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
< 0
Since [
(u2i − h2i)−1 + h2i (u2i − h2i)−2
]
=
u2i − h2i + h2i
(u2i − h2i)2
=
u2i
(u2i − h2i)2
< 0
Thus, it has been shown that the sign of C is positive.
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Next, the sign of D is determined.
d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
=
d
dh2i

∑
i
δ
h2i
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂x1
<0
(∑
i
1
u2i − h2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂xD2
∂p2
<0
)−1

= −
[
δ(u2i − h2i)−1 + δh2i
(−(u2i − h2i)−2(−1)) ](∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
− ∂x
D
2
∂x1
[
−
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−2 (−(u2i − h2i)−2(−1)) ]
= −
[
δ(u2i − h2i)−1 + δh2i(u2i − h2i)−1
](
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
+
∂xD2
∂x1
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−2
(u2i − h2i)−2
= −δ
[
u2i
(u2i − h2i)2
](
∂xD2
∂p2
)−1
+
∂xD2
∂x1
(
∂xD2
∂p2
)−2
(u2i − h2i)−2 < 0
Thus, it has been shown that the sign of D is negative.
It is thus clear that
dx1
dh2i
> 0 if
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ C > 0
> −x2 d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ D < 0
And vice versa:
dx1
dh2i
< 0 if
dx2
dh2i
∣∣∣∣
x1
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ C > 0
< −x2 d
dh2i
(
∂p2
∂x1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ D < 0
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